Mac Security Posture Pro
com.0.3.1
How hardened is this Mac, and what is set to run on it.
Editor’s note for 0.3.1: The published v0.3.1 archive is Apple Silicon (arm64) only.
Versions 0.1.0, 0.2.0 and 0.3.0 were revoked on . Install 0.3.1.
What it does
It grades how hardened this Mac is, then lists what is set to run on it and which apps have privacy access. It only reads.
What it reads
- SIP / FileVault / Gatekeeper / firewall state (system tools)
- XProtect bundle
Info.plist - LaunchDaemons / LaunchAgents plists +
codesignverdicts TCC.db(non-Apple client ids + services only)- System extensions (
systemextensionsctl) + third-party kernel extensions (kmutil) - Login / background items — Background Task Management (
sfltool dumpbtm) - Configuration profiles (
profiles) - Download-quarantine events — agent + timestamp + type only, never URLs (
LSQuarantine)
As declared in its signed entry. The list does not limit what an unsandboxed plugin can read.
What you’ll see
An example summary record from its signed entry, type posture.report.
Security posture: grade B (82/100) — 2 item(s) flagged
- Generated at
generatedAt - 2026-07-01T00:00:00Z
- Score
score - 82
- Grade
grade - B
- Flagged count
flaggedCount - 2
Full record
{"contentType": "posture.report","summary": "Security posture: grade B (82/100) — 2 item(s) flagged","privacyClass": "metadata","confidence": "derived","data": {"schemaVersion": 2,"generatedAt": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z","score": 82,"grade": "B","flaggedCount": 2,"categoryCounts": {"persistence": 10,"tcc": 0,"quarantine": 171,"login_items": 0,"extensions": 29,"config_profiles": 0}}}
Other record types: posture.factor, posture.persistence_item, posture.tcc_grant, posture.quarantine_event, posture.login_item, posture.extension, posture.config_profile.
What it can’t tell you
Editor’s note for 0.3.1: Unavailable checks can distort the overall grade, and some unreadable sources may appear empty.
Editor’s note for 0.3.1: Its signed description says some probes “degrade gracefully when the sandbox denies them”. That describes an earlier design: like every first-party plugin, it runs unsandboxed.
Its access
Declares macOS access: Full Disk Access. Its results can be kept unencrypted.
Where it fits
Rave’s editorial reading of the signed entry.
What it can see of the Mac itself, from being set up to the records it leaves behind.
- Set upconfiguredIt reads this itself
- Arrivedwhen it showed upIt cannot see it
- Nowhow it looks nowIt reads this itself
- Usedwhen it was usedIt cannot see it
- Gonethat it was removedIt cannot see it
- Tracesrecords that can outlive itIt cannot see it
- It also sees
- what an app, extension or package looks like now.
- Time
- Records carry the time of the event itself.
- Identities
- It checks code signatures itself.
Signature and versions
| Publisher | maccrab-rave:first-party |
|---|---|
| Publisher key | 07e39eb12c15b8052f5249134ea3337a0789ebc799d1c58d097aaa548a8aaae3 |
| Archive SHA-256 | 625659eae34210deab30becb0c28d692a4b89189f0aaaca80f85dd3589d3c1bd |
| Source | Private. Commit 1bc7465405da, tag v0.3.1 |
| Checked | . Automated passes, as recorded: manifest-schema-v1, reproducible-build-verified, developer-id-signed, ed25519-signature-verified, publisher-key-pin-matched, publisher-key-not-revoked.Source rebuild not applicable: this first-party entry publishes no source repository for an independent rebuild. A recorded maintainer rebuild check is not independent source verification. |
| In catalog | Serial 8, signed |
| Revocation list | Serial 2, issued . MacCrab checks its own copy when installing; this date is not when your Mac last checked. No revocation for 0.3.1. |
Before it installs, MacCrab checks the catalog signature, this hash, the publisher key and the revocation list. How it checks The signed entry Its signature
Mac Security Posture Pro 0.3.1 (com.maccrab.forensics.posture-pro), archive SHA-256 625659eae34210deab30becb0c28d692a4b89189f0aaaca80f85dd3589d3c1bd, publisher key 07e39eb12c15b805…, Rave catalog 8, 2026-10-04.
Pastes as Markdown, with both hashes and the limits.
Versions
| 0.3.1 | Checked . Current. |
|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | Checked . Revoked : “These builds are not Developer-ID signed under the MacCrab team. MacCrab v1.21.4 and later refuse to execute an unsigned first-party plugin, because first-party plugins run unsandboxed and the code signature is what authorises that. Affected versions install successfully and then fail at run time. Superseded by 0.3.1, which is signed and verified; update to it.” |
| 0.2.0 | Checked . Revoked : “These builds are not Developer-ID signed under the MacCrab team. MacCrab v1.21.4 and later refuse to execute an unsigned first-party plugin, because first-party plugins run unsandboxed and the code signature is what authorises that. Affected versions install successfully and then fail at run time. Superseded by 0.3.1, which is signed and verified; update to it.” |
| 0.1.0 | Approved , recorded with no automated passes. Revoked : “These builds are not Developer-ID signed under the MacCrab team. MacCrab v1.21.4 and later refuse to execute an unsigned first-party plugin, because first-party plugins run unsandboxed and the code signature is what authorises that. Affected versions install successfully and then fail at run time. Superseded by 0.3.1, which is signed and verified; update to it.” |
Publisher’s description (signed)
A read-only security-posture collector AND machine inventory. It grades the Mac's hardening controls and enumerates everything on it that matters for a forensic timeline — so even a hardened Mac produces a rich, cross-referenceable corpus rather than a row of green checkmarks.
GRADE (score 0–100 + letter): • SIP, FileVault, Gatekeeper — the critical controls • Application Firewall (+ stealth mode) • XProtect malware-definition freshness • Download quarantine (LSQuarantine active?) • Launchd persistence integrity — resolves each LaunchDaemon/LaunchAgent program and code-signs it; flags unsigned / ad-hoc / unverifiable entries • Privacy-permission exposure (TCC)
INVENTORY (one artifact per item): • Every launchd persistence item — path, resolved program, signing verdict + Team ID • Non-Apple TCC privacy grants — service + bundle-id, high-risk flagged (never the grant bodies) • Login / background items (BTM) — identifier, developer, type, enabled/allowed • System extensions (NetworkExtension / Endpoint Security / DriverKit) + third-party kernel extensions • Configuration profiles (MDM / manual) — identifier, org, scope • Recent download-quarantine events — agent + timestamp + type ONLY (never the download URL)
COLLECTION (v0.3.0): code-signing (SecStaticCode), TCC + quarantine (SQLite), and SIP (IOKit NVRAM) run IN-PROCESS — no subprocess. FileVault / Gatekeeper / firewall / extensions / login items / profiles remain declared subprocess probes that degrade gracefully when the sandbox denies them.
Emits verdicts, counts, paths and bundle-ids only — no file contents, no secrets, no download URLs, no message/mail data.
Discussion
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